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Introduction 
Alan Gross has turned a 
Victor Turner to analyze public scientific controversies.  
Specifically, he has adopted Turner’s model of “social dramas” to 
examine the recombinant DNA controversy of the 1970s and the 
“battle over black lung disease
1990, 2006).  Each controversy was handled in a way that was 
meant to “contain conflict, to see to it that public controversy leads 
not to revolution, but to a reaffirmation or reordering of existing 
social values” (Gross,
case followed the four
“breach” occurred when one party defied some social routine at the 
expense of the interests of another party; second, the breach 
escalated into a “crisis,” and the two parties grew more polarized; 
third, the crisis escalated into the “redressive action” phase, which 
involves some kind of outside adjudicator to settle the issue; and 
fourth, redressive action lead to “reintegration,” whereby the tw
parties either established a new status quo together or remained 
stuck at odds.  “Each phase,” Turner points out, “has its own speech 
form and styles, its own rhetoric, its own kind of nonverbal 
languages and symbolisms” (Turner, 1974, 43).  By focusing 
texts central to each phase of the recombinant DNA and black lung 
controversies, Gross’s Turnerian analyses call attention to the 
broader tensions motivating public scientific controversies, 
encouraging us to “think of these debates in a wider polit
context, a legitimate perspective, since they are less about 
knowledge than about power” (Gross, 1984, 407).  In what follows, 
I argue that, for these same reasons, Turnerian analysis is useful for 
understanding disciplinary controversies, that are, p
counterintuitively, less about knowledge than about power.
Gross’s Turnerian analysis of the recombinant DNA controversy 
exemplifies a social drama wherein the balance of power between 
scientists and an offended public was called into question (Gros
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1984, 1996).  The first phase, the breach, occurred when geneticists 
broke social convention by unilaterally creating and judging their 
own ethical standards and procedures.  The second phase, the 
crisis, emerged when the parties crystallized into polarized factions 
as “the opponents of recombinant research wrested the issue from 
the control of the scientific community and successfully brought 
their case into the relatively uncontrolled arena of public debate” 
(Gross, 1996, 188).  In the third phase, redressive action, the debate 
was brought before federal courts and local legislatures—“arenas 
expressly dedicated to social closure” (Gross, 1996, 188).  Finally, 
the fourth phase, reintegration, did not play out as either the 
“healthier” or “less positive” versions of reintegration Turner lays 
out.  Instead of the breach either being resolved (the “healthier” 
version of reintegration), and instead of the larger social 
recognition and legitimization of the breach as a simple fact (the 
“less positive” version), the social drama of recombinant DNA was 
left unresolved.  Gross concludes that the recombinant DNA social 
drama is “one of a set of recurring conflicts concerning science and 
technology, all of which embody a similar clash of purposes: 
Americans want the benefits of a nearly totally protected science 
and technology, and none of the risks that nearly total protection 
entails” (Gross, 1996, 190).  In other words, the recombinant DNA 
social drama is a manifestation of a larger social drama between the 
conflicting interests of a pluralistic public.  But Gross’s analysis 
offers another important lesson: although “the public outcry [was] 
largely hysterical,” the drama could have been mitigated or avoided 
were it not for “the arrogance of experts,” who created the breach in 
the first place in “their attempt to circumvent in their own interests 
the checks and balances of an open society” (Gross, 1996, 192).  
Expertise was no barrier to a concerned public, who demanded a 
say in what goes on behind the usually closed doors of geneticists’ 
laboratories.1   
                                                    
1Although Turner applies this kind of analysis to social dramas in 
contexts as varied as the Mexican Revolution of 1810, the Icelandic Njál’s 
Saga, and the incorporation of the Ndembu into the Zambian nation 
(Turner, 1974, 38-41), he and Gross emphasize that the point is not to 
reveal some fundamental similarity between all societies (Gross, 1996, 
181).  “The phase structure of social dramas is not the product of instinct,” 
insists Turner, “but of models and metaphors carried in the actors’ heads.  
It is not here a case of ‘fire finding its own form,’ but of form providing a 
hearth, a flue, and a damper for fire” (Turner, 1974, 36).  Put in less poetic 
parlance, the ubiquity of the four-phase-structured social dramas is not 
due to an innate characteristic shared by all humanity; rather, it is the 
product of societies’ tendencies toward stabilizing routines and away from 
destabilizing conflicts. 
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The social drama of the recombinant DNA controversy reminds 
us that any perceived boundary between the science and society can 
be dismantled through intense rhetorical effort and a seemingly 
stable balance of power between the two can be upended.  Gross’s 
Turnerian analysis of the black lung controversy demonstrates how 
some sciences—in this case medical science—are more “socially 
saturated” than others; that is, some scientific practices and objects 
are more motivated by public and political concerns than by “a pure 
intellectual pursuit of best answers” (Bazerman and De los Santos, 
2005).  In the case of the black lung controversy, coal miners 
aligned with medical scientists to oppose coal industry leaders in a 
battle over whether black lung should be redefined as a disease.  
Ultimately, the miners, medical scientists, and a cadre of other 
sympathetic parties altered the very idea of what might be counted 
as a disease, and the miners were compensated appropriately.  The 
volunteers who helped the miners achieve their goal continued 
trying to extend the successes of the black lung case into other 
industries, such as quarry and textile workers, but the miners were 
not interested in such sweeping social change, and so they no 
longer offered their support to such efforts.  Moreover, politicians 
worried that more federal aid for workers compensation could 
quickly become too expensive.  Thus, with faltering support and 
political resistance, the social status quo quietly reasserted itself 
(Gross, 2006, 153-61). 
Gross’s analyses illuminate an important point about 
boundaries between sciences and societies:  because sciences are 
more or less socially saturated, such boundaries are negotiable.  In 
other words, boundaries between sciences and publics are not fixed, 
but are rhetorically enacted and reenacted.  In the decades leading 
to the recombinant DNA social drama, geneticists had enacted and 
reenacted a firm boundary between themselves and their publics.  
Through rhetorical effort, though, members of the public enacted a 
new boundary.  Moreover, the enactments and reenactments of 
these boundaries enact different realities.  The reality of 
occupational disease prior to the black lung social drama did not 
include black lung.  But miners and their supporters enacted a new 
reality in which black lung is enacted as a disease.  Any boundary 
between science and society is, as Annemarie Mol puts it, “part of a 
practice.  It is a reality enacted” (Mol, 2002, 44, emphasis in 
original). 
Disciplinary boundaries are also continuously enacted and 
reenacted through practices.  Many scientists, however, argue that 
their disciplinary and sub-disciplinary divisions are the result of 
fundamentally different perspectives on a singular, fixed nature.  
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These scientists understand their differences as primarily 
epistemological rather than as a matter of enactment.  This is true 
of many contemporary ecologists who, in their efforts to address 
the impending threat of ecocide, insist that their discipline must 
find a way to transcend epistemological differences to form a 
unified approach to planetary problems. Whereas RoS is not 
equipped to resolve epistemological disputes over which way of 
knowing is best, we are well equipped to mediate in social dramas 
where disciplinary fragmentation is enacted and reenacted. 
In a recent clarion call to the field of rhetoric, technology, 
science, and medicine (RTSM), Carl Herndl and Lauren Cutlip 
write,  
RTSM will thrive if it builds interdisciplinary alliances, 
engages with our colleagues in science to help manage 
uncertainty and the threat of ecocide, and develops 
specific strategies and tools to put into practice our 
disciplinary intentions to make a difference. We should 
move from talking about science to doing science. 
(Herdl and Cutlip, 2013, 7) 
Herndl and Cutlip’s goal is tied to their proposition that RoS 
scholars set aside epistemological questions about how we can 
better know something and focus instead on questions of how we 
can better act together—a proposition at the heart of what Scott 
Graham and Herndl and call a “post-plural” rhetoric of science.  
Graham and Herndl argue that “[i]nterdisciplinary work has 
become a virtually inextricable part of contemporary scientific 
practice” (Graham and Herndl, 2013, 104).  But the discipline of 
ecology, which is known for its cross-disciplinary reach, has 
struggled to cohere as a discipline in its own right.  Graham and 
Herndl’s work suggests that, when investigating how ecologists 
might achieve greater disciplinary cohesion, rhetoricians should 
shift their focus from what the epistemological differences are 
toward how disciplinary differences came about.  “The rhetorical 
question,” they argue, “ceases to be ‘What is your disagreement?’ 
and becomes ‘Where does your problem come from?’” (Graham and 
Herndl, 2013, 123).  Their post-plural rhetoric of science is rooted 
in Mol’s theory of multiple ontologies, which, in contrast to 
incommensurability theory—“a theory of seeing and knowing”—is 
“a theory of doing and being” (Graham and Herndl, 2013, 110).  
Graham and Herndl conclude that those of us seeking to intervene 
in scientific controversies should take Mol’s advice:  “Don’t attend 
to what is loudest, the fight, but shift your attention a little, widen 
it, and try to see what all this noise is part of” (Graham and Herndl, 
2013, 123, referring to Mol, 2002). 
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Gross’s analyses of public debates as Turnerian “social dramas” 
takes a step toward developing a post-plural rhetoric of science.  
Accordingly, I apply a Turnerian analysis to the social drama that 
occurred when a group of American ecologists lobbied to 
participate in the International Biological Program (IBP) during the 
1960s and 70s.  These ecologists thought that participating in the 
IBP was a major opportunity for ecology to establish itself as a 
legitimate scientific discipline in its own right.  But it was an uphill 
climb for them to secure funding to participate in the program, and 
to overcome the widespread skepticism among their colleagues in 
biology who worried that the field of ecology was not mature 
enough—not coherent enough—to avoid an expensive and 
embarrassing public failure.  Participation in the IBP helped 
legitimize the discipline of ecology among scientists and to quickly 
gain widespread social prominence as the scientific basis for 
addressing some of the most pressing issues facing humanity (Kwa, 
1987). But the social drama from which ecology emerged is still 
reenacted in disciplinary controversies today.  Ecology is an 
increasingly fractured discipline of sub-fields.  I argue that many of 
the purported schisms that exist in ecology today are not a matter 
of un-aligned perspectives; rather, these schisms are differently 
staged reenactments of the same social drama.  
Breach 
The social drama of the IBP began in the early 1960s amid a 
disciplinary milieu where divisions had sprouted between “new” 
and “old” approaches to biology.  In his 1962 and 1964 annual 
reports to the Biological and Medical Science department of the 
National Science Foundation, Harve Carlson referred directly to a 
“breach” in biology between “proponents of the new and the old, of 
the molecular approach versus the classical approach, of the lab 
biologist versus the field biologist.  In one school, one side 
dominates; in another the other side dominates.  Good people are 
forced to leave or retire early in order that sweeping innovations 
may be made” (qtd. in Appel, 2000, 207).  By acknowledging that 
the breach between two technical approaches to scientific objects 
had social and political ramifications for scientists.  Carlson 
implicitly acknowledged that the technical, the social, and the 
political are not isolated spheres of activity, but converge in 
disciplinary practices.  He implied, that is, that the boundaries 
between science, politics, and society were dissolving or had 
dissolved.  In the early 1960s ecosystems ecologists were included 
among proponents of the “new” biology, while evolutionary and 
population ecologists and other biologists working in more 
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established sub-disciplines were proponents of the “old” biology.  
This breach helped set in motion the social drama of the IBP.2  
Proponents of ecosystems ecology lauded the field as a 
revolutionary but underused science.  To fulfill its potential called 
for unprecedented levels of funding and international cooperation.  
Some U.S. scientists saw the IBP as a chance to finally secure 
funding to implement their visions for large-scale ecosystems 
analysis. The timing for the program was, in some ways, especially 
apt.  The International Geophysical Year (IGY), which took place 
1957-1958, had been a recent success in terms of both international 
collaboration and public perception, and the IBP meant to 
capitalize on the goodwill that program had garnered by following 
the positive example of “big science” set by the IGY with its own 
example of “big biology” (Appel, 2000, 179-80; 226-34).  Some 
American ecologists who saw the IBP as an opportunity to unveil 
their vision of “big ecology” took the first tentative steps toward 
joining the international program.  In 1963, the National Academy 
of Sciences (NAS) assembled an ad hoc U.S. National Committee on 
the International Biological Program (USNC/IBP), which set about 
ascertaining the level of interest in the program among American 
scientists via questionnaires and solicited responses from members 
of the Ecological Society of America (ESA).   
As Frank Blair, a member of the ad hoc committee, later noted, 
“These procedures, not unexpectedly, produced a mixed bag of 
                                                    
2It is worth mentioning that, despite my repeated reference to “the 
social drama of the IBP,” the controversy I detail here was quite unique to 
the lead up to the United States’ participation in the international 
program, and was not at all typical of the IBP as a whole.  No other 
countries had such a hard time agreeing on whether or not they should 
participate, and once the project was underway many scientists reported 
that interdisciplinary cohesion developed seamlessly.  One scientist, Bill 
Heal, working on the Tundra Biome project wrote excitedly in his notes 
about how well the international, interdisciplinary work was going: 
 
Thus we developed new ideas through exchange of information 
[which] is summarized by the equation: 
2+2=5 
I.e., the whole is greater than the sum of the parts or put the pieces 
together!  This exchange of ideas, from different nationalities, different 
environments and different research backgrounds gave us insight into the 
fundamental processes of decomposition and the value of “synthesis”.  It 
has had a large influence on my career development (qtd. in Coleman, 
2010, 19-20). 
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responses” (Blair, 1977, 6).  From the 104 replies from members of 
the ESA, more than 100 scientists from a wide array of 
specializations expressed interest in participating.  Among the 
solicited and mostly unsolicited responses the committee received, 
however, a strong anti-participation sentiment was voiced.  One 
such letter—described by Blair as “very critical and pessimistic”—
from ESA member Lamont Cole read: 
I have heard enough discussion of IBP to be certain that 
two suspicions are widely held.  These are: 
a) It is a boondoggle designed to ride the coattails of 
IGY. 
b) It is a scheme to raid the U.S. Treasury, largely for 
the benefit of foreign scientists. 
I am not concerned with the truth or falsity of these 
views.  The important point is that they will appear to be 
confirmed if the program is undertaken and is not an 
outstanding success (qtd. in Blair, 1977, 8). 
Worried about the reputation of their fledgling discipline should 
the IBP fail, Cole and other ecologists wrote to complain that U.S. 
efforts to participate in the IBP were a blatant example of “me-too” 
money-grabbing that invoked the IGY by name but lacked the 
careful organization that made the IGY so successful.  This ethical 
critique called into question the program’s intentions and raised the 
possibility that the IBP might be exposed as a fraud thus 
delegitimizing ecology by association.   
Tom Park—himself a member of the ad hoc committee—noted 
similar reservations in a cautionary memo. Park wrote, “My points 
are these:” 
1. If there had not been an IGY there would not now be 
projected an IBP. 
2. The IGY had meaning. Relatively simple 
measurements could be defined and taken. These 
data, in turn, contributed conceptually to geophysics. 
3. The IBP does not enjoy this meaning: 
a. No such simple measurements can be taken. 
b. There is little, if any, conceptual framework onto which the 
measurements that are taken can be apportioned (qtd. in 
Blair, 1977, 14, emphasis in original). 
  
Park’s points are similar to Cole’s in that they express concern that 
the IBP was disingenuously riding the coattails of the IGY.  But 
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Park’s points underscore a crucial tension that coursed through the 
social drama of the IBP, and that emerges again and again in 
ecological disciplinary debates.  In classical rhetorical terms, this 
tension has to with the “transformation of practical wisdom into 
accredited techniques, of phronêsis into technê,” which, as Steven 
Mailloux explains, “becomes part of the conditions of possibility for 
the paths of thought in any disciplinary community” (Mailloux, 
2006, 5).  U.S. ecologists’ involvement in the IBP was doomed to 
fail, according to its detractors, because they lacked accredited 
techniques. 
The crucial difference between the IBP and the IGY, as Park 
understood it, was that the IBP could not expect to reap the same 
conceptual benefits that the discipline of geophysics reaped from 
the IGY; the IBP lacked both the conceptual disciplinary coherence 
that geophysics enjoyed and the methodological repertoire that 
helps establish such coherence.  So, despite the excitement among 
some ecosystems ecologists about the prospects of large-scale 
studies of ecosystems, such a project lacked “meaning” in two 
senses: (1) ecosystems ecology was not developed as a disciplinary 
conceptual framework from which meaning could be derived; and 
(2) the methods by which disciplinary meaning is made were 
untested.  Responses such as Park’s and Cole’s indicate that 
ecosystems ecologists were faced with a catch-22: they could not 
develop a coherent disciplinary framework without developing 
accredited techniques, but when given the opportunity to develop 
those techniques (which required a large-scale program like the 
IBP), their colleagues argued that they lacked a coherent 
disciplinary framework. 
Park and Cole were not alone.  Even other members of the ad 
hoc committee itself expressed ambivalence toward the IBP.  But 
the committee was confident that ecosystems ecology was mature 
enough to prove itself by participating in the IBP project, and they 
felt the positive responses to their inquiries reflected that 
confidence well enough.  The ayes had it.  The committee ultimately 
decided to favorably recommend U.S. participation in the IBP to 
the NAS, which in turn sent a delegation to Paris to participate in 
the IBP organizing assembly.  That delegation returned with the 
recommendation that a U.S. National Committee for the IBP 
(USNC/IBP) be established under the NAS.  The recommendation 
was approved, and—ready or not, “boondoggle” or not, “me-too” 
cash-grab or not—the U.S. was participating in the IBP.  
Turner notes that the breach phase of a social drama is initiated 
according to the “altruistic intent” of the offending parties.  “A 
dramatic breach may be made by an individual, certainly,” Turner 
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writes, “but he always acts, or believes he acts, on behalf of the 
other parties, whether they are aware of it or not.  He sees himself 
as a representative, not as a lone hand” (Turner, 1974, 38).  The 
selection and rejection of representatives is thus an important point 
of analysis in the breach phase of a social drama—a point that 
warrants some attention here before we move onto the crisis phase.   
The offending parties in this case were the representatives of the 
ad hoc committee and the NAS, who, despite having heard the 
dissent ringing throughout the scientific community (and even 
from within their own committee), decided to go ahead with the 
plan to hitch American ecology’s reputation to the IBP’s wagon.  
The bureaucratic measures taken by the NAS and the committee 
were meant to minimize any offense at the committee’s decision.  
But among the offended parties, some raised ethical questions 
about the competency of their representatives.  For example, in the 
same letter quoted from above, Cole objected to the representative 
role the NAS was meant to play in the decision to participate in the 
IBP:  “I suppose it is logical for those unfamiliar with the situation 
to assume that NAS can speak for all science, but, unfortunately, 
ecology is a field in which NAS is not highly competent, and in this 
case apparently didn’t know where to turn” (qtd. in Blair, 1977, 8).  
Arguments such as this one, which effectively questioned the 
validity of the NAS committee’s claim to representative status, cast 
serious doubts on their ability to represent ecology as a discipline. 
The members of the USNC/IBP soon discovered that Cole was 
right to be concerned about the NAS’s lack of competence in the 
field of ecology.  The Academy appointed, to Blair’s dismay, a non-
ecologist (indeed, to Blair’s further dismay, a non-biologist) as 
chairman of the USNC/IBP.  In a letter to NAS President Frederick 
Seitz, Blair noted that he was “shocked” to learn of the 
appointment, writing, “My experience with the planning of IBP to 
date clearly impresses me with the certainty that the program is 
largely an ecological one.  It is very difficult to visualize adequate 
guidance of the committee by one, however able in other respects, 
who is not only not an ecologist, but not even a biologist” (Blair, 
1977, 21).  Seitz responded that he and an advisory group had 
appointed someone “widely conversant with the international scene 
and a diversity of international problems affecting science” (qtd. in 
Blair, 1977, 21). Blair and his like-minded colleagues in the ESA 
managed to convince Seitz to name two ecologists as co-vice-
chairmen of the USNC/IBP. 
This incident was a miniaturized version of the larger social 
drama in which it was embedded.  The NAS breached the trust of its 
constituents.  The constituents responded, escalating the breach 
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into a crisis wherein one party (the ecologists) argued that their 
disciplinary interests were at stake and so deserved representation 
from an ecologist.  The other party (President Seitz and his advisory 
group) argued that familiarity with the international science 
“scene” was more important in tackling such a massive 
international project.  The crisis was essentially a dispute over 
whether disciplinary expertise or social influence should take 
precedence in appointing disciplinary representatives.  Appropriate 
redressive bureaucratic measures were taken, and something like 
the status quo was reassumed with the eventual appointment of two 
ecologists as co-vice-chairmen of the USNC/IBP.  Summarized 
more simply, this miniature disciplinary drama pitted arguments 
for the importance of technical acumen against arguments for the 
importance of social and political clout, and it resulted in what 
Gross calls “the healthier” version of reintegration, which “involves 
the incorporation of warring groups and their conflicting ideologies 
a new social synthesis” (Gross, 1996, 189).  But the resolution of 
this miniature drama did not foreshadow the end of the larger 
social drama of the IBP. 
Crisis 
Over the next few years, USNC/IBP planning moved along 
sluggishly.  The planning phase for IBP projects was to last until 
1967, at which time the operations phase of each project was to 
launch.  The USNC/IBP was established only in September of 1964, 
leaving American scientists just barely over two years to coordinate 
an unprecedentedly large-scale research plan and secure funding 
for it, and prospects for funding were dwindling.  By 1966, the 
National Science Board had only tentatively agreed to fund some 
very scaled-back research into “two or three of the most urgent 
problems . . . whose effective study requires international 
collaborative effort” (Appel, 2000,  229), and the NSF had notified 
the NAS that it would not provide a block grant for the IBP as it had 
done for the IGY.   
Some of this fiscal reticence had to do with skepticism toward 
the program—many still insisted it was a disingenuous 
boondoggle—and some of it had to with skepticism toward the NAS, 
which Harve Carlson, then chairman of the NSF’s Department of 
Biological and Medical Sciences, “thoroughly distrusted . . . as a 
powerful institution wanting to take over policy-making from NSF” 
(Appel, 2000, 230).  Thus, NSF historian Toby Appel notes, “the 
year before the U.S. program was to begin operation, the U.S. 
National Committee found itself in a frustrating position.”  She 
explains, 
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IBP at this point was to consist of a series of smaller 
ecological projects within the general framework 
adopted by the international community.  But if NSF 
would not provide block funds for the Academy or give 
IBP proposals special standing, then the USNC could do 
little beyond certifying unsolicited projects (many of 
them ongoing) as relevant to IBP when certification 
conferred no acknowledged advantage.  On this basis, it 
was impossible to organize diffuse projects into a 
coherent program (Appel 2000, 230). 
The NAS responded to this situation by holding a meeting of the 
USNC/IBP in Williamstown, Massachusetts, where the focus 
shifted toward the formation of an “Integrated Research Program” 
on “Analysis of Ecosystems” within six “biomes”—eastern 
deciduous forests, tropical forests, grasslands, tundra, and desert 
(McIntosh, 1985, 216; Appel, 2000, 230).   
These projects were controversial among U.S. biologists—whom 
the British ecologist Conrad Waddington characterized as the 
“toughest biological community into which to launch the [IBP]” 
(Worthington, 1975, 8)—for at least two reasons.  First, the biomes 
to be studied were massive units of analysis by the biological 
standards of the time.  The U.S. biological community was 
dominated by molecular biologists and microbiological geneticists 
who, Waddingon notes, were quick to mention “in the hearing of 
government or the academy, that any organism bigger than E. coli 
serves only to confuse the issue” (Worthington, 1975, 8-9).  Second, 
the Analysis of Ecosystems projects relied on systems analysis 
methodologies that were highly suspect to many biologists.  
Systems analysis offered a new approach to ecology—termed 
“systems ecology”3—that used computer models and differential 
equations to predict changes in highly contingent, large-scale 
ecosystems.  Facing a lack of funding and a surplus of criticism 
from colleagues, as Robert McIntosh observes, “The U.S. program 
did not develop without crisis” (McIntosh, 1985, 216).   
According to Turner, during the crisis phase of social dramas, 
“paradigms become transformed into metaphors and symbols with 
reference to which political power is mobilized and in which there is 
                                                    
3Systems ecology is a somewhat ill defined approach to ecosystem 
ecology, and should not be confused with ecosystem ecology itself.  Robert 
Lilienfield, in The Rise of Systems Theory (1978), identifies six different 
sources of systems theories that have influenced systems ecology, from 
the cybernetic system theory of Norbert Weiner to the game theory of Von 
Neuman and Morgenstern (McIntosh, 1985, 232). 
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a trial of strength between influential paradigm bearers” (qtd. in 
Gross, 1984, 399).  At the crisis stage of a social drama, the breach 
widens to a degree that is “coextensive with some dominant 
cleavage in the widest set of relevant social relations to which the 
conflicting or antagonistic parties belong” (qtd. in Gross, 2005, 44).  
The dominant cleavage in ecology in the 1960s was between the 
more established biologists, who studied ecosystems in terms of 
their functional components at a single level of organization, and 
ecosystems ecologists, who studied ecosystems in terms of the 
relationships between those functional components across levels of 
organization.  During the crisis phase, both sides emphasized their 
differences, effectively polarizing the two approaches. 
One influential ecosystems ecologist, Eugene Odum, attempted 
to mobilize all ecologists around the concept of the ecosystem, 
proclaiming in a 1964 article titled “The New Ecology,” “Ecologists 
can rally around the ecosystem as their basic unit just as molecular 
biologists now rally around the cell . . .  The new ecology is thus a 
systems ecology—or, to put it in other words, the new ecology deals 
with the structure and function of levels of organization beyond 
that of the individual and the species” (Odum, 1964, 15, emphasis in 
original). Through rallying cries like these, ecosystems ecologists 
such as Odum sought to mobilize an audience of ecologists 
interested in what they called a “holistic,” or sometimes 
“integrated,” approach to ecosystems, which they touted as “the 
new,” or sometimes “revolutionary,” ecology (for many examples of 
this kind of language, see McIntosh, 1985, 193-241).   
But Odum knew he could not simply assume his audience 
identified with his cause.  Recognizing that he was making a 
somewhat incendiary statement, Odum predicted two responses 
from two “groups” of people.  One group would take it as obvious 
that a whole ecosystem is not the sum of its parts, so they would see 
nothing novel about “the new ecology.”  “The other group,” he 
wrote, “remains unconvinced that there is anything really new or 
different at ecological levels that can not be ultimately explained 
either by the reduction of the whole into even smaller parts or by 
expanding knowledge gleaned from parts directly into the whole” 
(Odum, 1964, 15).  Odum argued that this group subscribed to a 
“reductionist philosophy,” according to which complex large-scale 
processes could be explained in terms of the processes of their 
components.  Alluding to those aforementioned reductionists who 
thought that any organism larger than E. coli complicated the issue, 
“if anyone thinks that bird or human behavior can be understood by 
reducing the population to macromolecules, I would like to learn 
how this might be done” (Odum, 1964, 15).  Thus we can see the 
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two ecological groups crystallizing as they take their own positions 
as given and argue that the other position is untenable.  
Gross notes that Kenneth Burke’s rhetorical theory is 
indispensible for “identifying the styles of conflict within the four 
Turnerian phases” (Gross, 1984, 398).  In the social drama of the 
IBP, Burke’s concept of identification and Maurice Charland’s 
corollary theory of constitutive rhetoric seem especially useful for 
understanding how people rhetorically enacted the separation 
between the new and the old ecologies, and how they became 
entrenched in one sub-discipline or another during this crisis 
phase.  Identification eschews the idea that audiences are pre-
existing groups of people simply waiting to be persuaded, and 
instead calls attention to how audiences come to identify 
themselves as persuadable subjects in the first place (Burke, 1966, 
301-2; 1950, 19-46).  Burke observed that identification has 
profound implications for activities that are commonly understood 
as “autonomous,” such as scientific disciplinary activities:  
The fact that an activity is capable of reduction to 
intrinsic, autonomous principles does not argue that it is 
free from identification with other orders of motivation 
extrinsic to it. [. . .] The human agent, qua human agent, 
is not motivated solely by the principles of a specialized 
activity, however strongly this specialized power, in its 
suggestive role as imagery, may affect his character.  Any 
specialized activity participates in a larger unit of action.  
“Identification” is a word for the autonomous activity’s 
place in this wider context, a place with which the agent 
may be unconcerned (Burke, 1950, 27). 
Charland’s theory of constitutive rhetoric accounts for the 
processes at work in Burkean identification.  “If,” as Charland 
writes, “it is easier to praise Athens before Athenians than 
Laecedemonians, we should ask how those in Athens come to 
experience themselves as Athenians” (Charland, 1984, 134).  In a 
disciplinary social drama such as that of the IBP, much of this 
constitutive rhetorical identification is carried out during the crisis 
phase when disciplinary actors recognize a breach, notice that it is 
widening, and find they must choose a side on which to stand.   
Odum’s revolutionary rhetoric was necessary for, as his 
colleague George Van Dyne phrased it, putting systems ecology “on 
the board” (qtd. in McIntosh, 1985, 221).  But once systems ecology 
was on the board—that is, once it had established itself as a 
seemingly autonomous activity—the revolutionary rhetoric faded 
somewhat and systems ecologists shifted into a more magnanimous 
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position.  Thus, when Van Dyne announced the founding of a new 
Systems Ecology program at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in a 
1966 report, he included Odum’s statement that “the new ecology is 
thus a systems ecology” (qtd. in Van Dyne, 1966, 9), but only well 
after acknowledging the controversy surrounding systems ecology: 
Neither is this area of work in ecology clearly defined nor 
do all ecologists view it equally. As with any new field, 
systems ecology is beset with vociferous skeptics (largely 
those who have done well under the old conditions) but 
supported primarily by lukewarm champions (largely 
those who may do well under the new conditions). [. . .] 
Often we feel that our own work and interests are of 
extra importance, but I do not propose systems ecology 
to be a new panacea, nor that we neglect more 
conventional approaches in ecology. (Van Dyne, 1966, 2) 
Van Dyne’s dialed back rhetoric was a sensible move for promoting 
a fledgling sub-discipline that wanted autonomy but not isolation. 
Many ecosystems ecologists would continue to strive for a similar 
balance in the next phase of the social drama of the IBP, but some 
would continue to overstate their case. 
Redressive Action 
Instead of appealing directly to the funding agencies that had 
repeatedly spurned them, the USNC/IBP turned to Congress to 
seek federal funds directly. Two important representatives for 
ecosystems ecology, Frank Blair and Roger Revelle, arranged a set 
of hearings before Representative Emilio Daddario’s Subcommittee 
on Science, Research and Development, which is where redressive 
action phase of the social drama of the U.S. IBP took place. 
Revelle, who was identified by his colleagues as “a real mover 
and shaker . . . [who] really shone when it came to getting the 
process started” (Coleman, 2010, 25) and “someone with the 
reputation of a real thruster” (Worthington, 1975, 10), opened the 
1967 hearing by submitting a prepared statement to the 
subcommittee.  His statement began with a sweeping discussion of 
the self-inflicted biological problems facing the planet.  Humans, 
Revelle observed, have “alter[ed] the face of the earth through 
technology,” and they have also altered their own biology by 
extending their life expectancies considerably.  The problem with 
all of this change is that “[o]ur technology has outpaced our 
understanding, our cleverness has grown faster than our wisdom” 
Therefore, argued Revelle, increased understanding and wisdom, 
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of the kind that only ecosystems ecology could provide, were 
necessary: 
Because of our limited understanding of the 
relationships among living things, we are limited in our 
ability to predict the effects of technical change or to 
help the technologists conserve the values and utilize the 
abundance of the world of life.  Our goal should be not to 
conquer the natural world but to live in harmony with it.  
To attain this goal, we must learn how to control both 
the external environment and ourselves.  Especially, we 
need to learn how to avoid irreversible change.  If we do 
not, we shall deny to future generations the opportunity 
to choose the kind of world in which they want to live.  
Greater understanding will make it possible for man to 
respond to opportunity as well as to react to need.  To 
gain such understanding is the underlying purpose of the 
International Biological Program (IBP, 1967, 2). 
Revelle’s statement goes on to detail the objectives of the IBP and 
the U.S. program’s plan to address those objectives. 
The subcommittee focused on the specifics of the projects later 
in the hearings.  But, Revelle’s argument for an ecology aimed 
toward control—environmental control, population control, and 
self-control—was more persuasive to Daddario and his fellow 
Congressmen than the precise details of the project’s 
implementation.  Daddario read a passage from a report that had 
been commissioned by the subcommittee the previous year, titled 
“A Challenge to Science and Society,” which speaks to the 
persuasive power of this argument: 
Ecology generates a viewpoint or an attitude which, 
simply stated, involves wise use of our environment for 
the benefit of man. It does not imply a balance of nature 
or avoidance of change in the landscape. Rather, ecology 
encourages the manipulation of nature, but with 
knowledge of the interacting forces and immutable laws, 
not haphazardly or indiscriminately (IBP, 1967, 11). 
Daddario immediately followed his quote with praise: “We look 
with great favor, Dr. Revelle, on what you have been trying to do, 
not just in support of this resolution, but in your work, which is 
recognized internationally” (IBP, 1967, 11).  As the earliest 
statements of the hearing indicate, Daddario and his subcommittee 
were quick to align themselves with the ecosystem ecologists’ goal 
of environmental control and manipulation. 
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Given the lack of alignment among ecologists themselves, how 
was alignment between the ecologists and politicians achieved so 
easily?  Certainly Revelle carried some clout as a political and 
scientific “mover and shaker” with him to the subcommittee 
hearings. The presence of a cadre of other supportive scientists 
backing him did not hurt.  But Chunglin Kwa argues that we cannot 
simply attribute Revelle’s USNC/IBP’s success to lobbying and 
coalition building.  More important was the use of metaphor of 
ecosystem-as-cybernetic machine, which grounded the ecologists 
and Congressmen’s shared understanding.  The ecosystem-as-
cybernetic machine metaphor had found traction among the 
broader public through books such as Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring 
and Paul Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb (Kwa, 1987, 431).  The 
environmental movement of the 1960s had popularized the 
ecosystem-as-cybernetic machine metaphor and its corollary 
concepts, such as homeostasis and feedback.  Thus the cybernetic 
vernacular common to ecosystems ecology had also become fairly 
common among the American public and their representatives.  For 
ecologists, the machine metaphor, “provided an heuristic for 
ecological research: systems ecology was to reveal the structure of 
the machinery of the ecosystem.  It also set out a goal for ecology: 
specifying the conditions under which ecosystems could remain 
stable” (Kwa, 1987, 428).  Moreover, the machine metaphor offered 
a heuristic for political action: once the structure of the machinery 
of the ecosystem was “revealed,” the public could go about deciding 
how best to repair it. 
The cybernetic metaphor of ecosystems as machines served its 
persuasive purpose well in that, as Kwa argues, it “fulfilled an 
intermediary role between ecologists and politicians” (Kwa, 1987, 
414).  But when ecologists went so far as to suggest that they could 
be the ones to determine how to best manipulate the machine, they 
veered into the extra-scientific realms of politics and philosophy.  
Some ecologists made untenable claims about how ecological 
understanding of environmental problems might be applied in 
addressing those problems, inadvertently overstepping their 
boundaries.  When, for example, Carlton Ray, a pathologist at 
Johns Hopkins University, suggested that the Analysis of 
Ecosystems projects were aimed not at understanding the cause or 
effects of pollution but instead at political action to mitigate the 
problems of pollution, Representative George Brown pushed back: 
You are getting suspiciously close to a field which is 
outside the scope of science, one of normative 
judgments. . . . Are you contemplating some 
philosophical aspect of this approach to the biological 
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program? Are you assuming maybe that this ought to be 
sort of an international philosophical year as well as an 
International Biological Program? (IBP, 1967, 196) 
Ray responded that he “was merely pointing out that the 
International Biological Program does not separate itself from the 
problem of human welfare”). To this Brown replied, “I think your 
point is correct.  I am merely making the point that you have 
certain preconceptions about the nature of human welfare which 
are not necessarily a part of any scientific program” (IBP, 1967,. 
197).  Later in Ray’s testimony, Rep. Brown summarized his 
argument: 
I sense in the witness a nostalgia of the old days in which 
man and nature are in balance and everything right with 
the world. . . . To determine that there is some natural 
balance as you seem to be hinting at is a highly 
philosophical question (IBP, 1967, 199). 
Representative Brown’s statements stood out among his fellow 
Representatives’ as especially critical, and he downplayed their bite 
by suggesting that he was “playing the devil’s advocate” (IBP, 1967, 
199).  But these sorts of arguments were even more common among 
scientists who were increasingly wary of ecosystems ecologists’ 
perceived philosophical overreach.  For example, an article in the 
British journal Nature from December, 1967 reported:  
Consideration of the philosophical bases of the 
International Biological Program (IBP) has so 
preoccupied scientific leadership in the United States 
that observers elsewhere have wondered when American 
biologists might get down to specific projects, and what 
these might be. A stream of stately essays has been the 
main output so far; yet Phase 2, or the operational part 
of the IBP, was supposed to start last July. At that time, 
however, the National Committee was in the midst of 
Congressional hearings on the IBP and its funding (qtd. 
in Blair, 1977, 26). 
Similarly, as the Daddario subcommittee hearings published a 
report on the 1967 hearings, the U.S. journal Science reported that 
the Analysis of Ecosystems projects suffered, somewhat ironically, 
from “ecological sprawl” that spread it thinly over “a wide variety of 
seemingly unrelated projects” (Boffey, 1968, 1332). Herbert Curl, 
an oceanographer, wrote to Science to “add to [the] concise report 
on the ills of U.S. participation in the International Biological 
Program”:  
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It is highly improbable that a group of individuals who 
cannot agree on what constitutes a community can agree 
to get together for international cooperative research on 
communities. Not only is this an inauspicious time to 
commence major projects requiring new funds, but there 
is reason to believe that the field of ecology is not mature 
enough to benefit from a large-scale, coordinated 
program. This double misfortune is particularly 
disheartening since we are already in very deep 
ecological trouble (Curl, 1968, 1065). 
The Nature and Science articles, and Curl’s response to the latter, 
echo the doubts that polarized the old and new ecologists during 
the crisis phase. The journal articles characterized the project as 
disorganized, unfocused, and too philosophically flighty, and Curl’s 
response attributes these failings directly to the “immature” 
discipline of ecology. 
These doubts rarely found their way into the Congressional 
hearings, and after nearly a decade of the social drama of IBP, 
redressive action finally came in the form of Public Law 91-438, 
which was signed by Richard Nixon on October 7, 1970.  The law 
fully funded the Analysis of Ecosystems projects, funneling 40 
million dollars into the large biome projects and a few peripherally 
related smaller projects between 1970 and 1974.  The U.S. 
contribution was the largest of any country participating in the IBP. 
Reintegration 
Turner writes that, for the analyst of a social drama, reintegration is 
“an opportunity for taking stock. [The analyst] can now analyze the 
continuum synchronically, so to speak, at this point of arrest, 
having already fully taken into account and represented by 
appropriate constructs the temporal character of the drama” 
(Turner, 1974, 42).  Various accounts of the U.S.’s involvement in 
the IBP have engaged in such stocktaking.  Many have recognized 
the U.S./IBP as a watershed moment for ecosystems science, and 
the discipline of ecology more generally.  In a 1981 statement in the 
Bulletin of the Ecological Society of America, R.L. Burgess wrote, 
“In all probability, the single most important event for U.S. ecology 
in the last thirty years was the participation in the International 
Biological Program” (qtd. in McIntosh, 1985, 214).  This event was 
important in several ways.  For one thing, the collaboration 
between scientists and the Congressional Subcommittee on Science, 
Research, and Development secured massive funding for large-
scale ecological projects.  U.S. participation in the IBP was also 
important in that it helped legitimate ecology as a discipline.  
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Ecology did not enjoy much institutional status prior to the IBP.  
Prior to the 1970s, no U.S. universities granted degrees in ecology, 
and ecologists held very few positions on influential policy-
directing committees (Kwa, 1987, 416-17).  Much of that changed 
once the U.S. projects were endorsed by the IBP.  The American 
ecologist Frederick Smith credited the IBP with “lifting a minor 
subject to a position of major status” (qtd. in Worthington, 1975, 
10).  Finally, U.S. participation in the IBP was important because it 
helped establish ecology, and the study of ecosystems in particular, 
as the basic science that could solve our complex and increasingly 
dire environmental problems.  The environmental movement in the 
1960s and 70s had begun to coalesce around the ecosystem 
concept, and the swelling movement may have partly motivated 
Congress and the President to put their faith, and their (that is, the 
public’s) money, behind ecosystem ecology.  In sum, U.S. 
participation in the IBP established a source of funding for 
ecological studies where there had been none before, which in turn 
helped established ecology as a discipline, and which in turn helped 
establish ecosystem ecology as the foundational science for 
managing environmental crises. 
Nevertheless, the reintegration of “new” and “old” ecologies has 
not been fully realized.  The social drama of the IBP resulted in 
“Turner’s less positive notion of reintegration,” whereby the parties 
recognize and legitimate a schism between them.  In this case, the 
breach that Carlson first recognized between “old” and “new” 
approaches to biology were exacerbated during the crisis phase to 
an extent where the redressive action undertaken in federal 
government chambers was not enough to repair it.  For one thing, 
amid the grandiose rhetoric employed during the subcommittee 
hearings, some ecologists had made claims about their discipline’s 
“predictive power” and its ability to “improve world-wide 
productivity” and help solve the problems of overpopulation.  Thus, 
writes McIntosh, the discipline suffered “when more was claimed 
for it than it could deliver. . .   The solid achievements of ecology in 
the IBP ecosystem programs were sometimes masked by criticism 
of its failure to achieve the impossible” (McIntosh, 1985, 221).  The 
biome projects made some large strides toward developing the kind 
of understanding Revelle and his colleagues sought, but there was 
little or no chance that the projects, by themselves, could 
accomplish everything that some ecologists had touted. 
Positive integration continued to elude ecologists as, in the years 
following the IBP projects, ecologists continued to identify 
themselves according to the polarizing constitutive rhetoric of the 
crisis phase.  For example, in a 1976 review of a major volume of 
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systems analysis, limnologist Frank Rigler took up Odum’s 
dichotomy between old and new ecologies and repeatedly referred 
to himself and others who find systems analysis impenetrable as 
“oldies.”  On the sections of the volume having to do with biome 
modeling Rigler wrote: 
It is a biology with a new language—a new paradigm.  In 
the old days, despite our professional fragmentation, 
ecologists could understand and be interested in the 
work of geneticists, embryologists, molecular biologists, 
and others although we were inadequately trained to 
make original contributions to these fields.  Now, it 
seems that a branch of our own discipline is beyond 
some of us because the chapters on biome modeling left 
me bemused.  Eventually the source of the difficulty 
became clear.  Systems analysis modelers have a totally 
different publication paradigm.  Whereas we (the oldies) 
tend to publish the results of experiments we have 
actually done, they (the modelers) seem to publishing 
the equivalent of experiments they intend to do (Rigler, 
1976, 481). 
Using Kuhnian terminology in his critique, Rigler argues that the 
methodological differences between ecological “branches” amount 
to paradigmatic incommensurability.  Sub-disciplines cannot 
reconcile these differences, and thus have no use for each other. 
Reintegration is an ongoing process in ecology.  Tensions 
between sub-disciplines have abated in some cases,4 and many have 
sought, and are still seeking, a unified discipline.  But as new 
ecological approaches emerge, familiar disciplinary divisions 
continue to be reenacted.  For example, in 1988 Heinz Stolp, a 
microbial ecologist, lamented “the still existing gap between micro- 
and macroecology” (Stolp 1988, 282).  More recently, Loreau, 
Mouquet, and Holt, complained that “the traditional divide within 
ecology between the perspectives of population and community 
ecology on the one hand and ecosystem ecology on the other hand” 
has re-emerged in, and fractured, the sub-field of spatial ecology 
Loreau, Mouquet, and Holt, 2005, 418-19).  Assessing the prospects 
for a more unified “big ecology,” David Coleman writes, 
When viewed through the lens of three to four decades 
since the heyday of the IBP Biome programs, several 
features stand out. The main point that comes across is 
                                                    
4 See, for example, Bazerman and De los Santos’s study of the gradual 
unification of toxicology and ecotoxicology. 
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the sheer magnitude of the accomplishments by only a 
few hundred scientists working in concert over four 
decades. The second thought is: how much more could 
have been accomplished had there been a more 
concerted effort to involve a greater number of 
scientists, and to educate several hundred more graduate 
students, during that period (Coleman, 2010, 180). 
Although the U.S./IBP was geared toward just such a concerted 
effort to cast a wider net for ecology, this effort was diminished 
during the social drama that ensued. 
Conclusion 
Just as Turnerian analysis reveals diverse public debates about 
science and technology “as analogous events, perhaps even parallel 
enactments of the same social drama,” it also exposes disciplinary 
debates as analogous events and perhaps even parallel enactments 
of the same social drama. Since its earliest discernable beginnings 
as a formal science in the late 19th century, ecology has grown and 
split into several separate sub-disciplines.  Though the creation of 
such sub-disciplines is important for creating specialized 
knowledge, it has some drawbacks.  Specifically, it has become 
increasingly difficult for sub-disciplines to communicate with one 
another.  Michel Loreau, a contemporary French ecologist, notes 
that this is particularly true when it comes to community ecology 
and ecosystems ecology, two sub-disciplines that, according to 
Loreau, “[i]n a way, provide two different perspectives on the same 
material reality” (Loreau, 2010, ix).  To solve complex 
environmental problems, scientists such as Loreau argue, we need 
to reconcile these perspectives.  But though the problem may seem 
a matter of perspectival dispute, Turnerian analysis gives us a way 
of looking beyond “what is loudest, the fight,” and instead “trying to 
see what all this noise is part of” (Mol 2002, 123).   
Gross observes that “Turner’s concept [of social drama] best 
elucidates the ways in which societies attempt to contain conflict, to 
see to it that public controversy leads not to revolution, but to 
reaffirmation or a reordering of existing values” (Gross, 1984, 397). 
Calls for disciplinary unity, such as those made by Stolp and 
Loreau, can be understood as continuing attempts to contain 
conflict and to reorder and reaffirm existing ecological disciplinary 
values in the wake of the social drama of the IBP (Stolp, 1988, 
Loreau, 2010).  However, this conflict extends back to the 
disciplinary emergence of ecosystem ecology in the late 1960s and 
since that time sub-disciplinary factions have become fairly 
entrenched.  A Turnerian analysis of the emergence of ecosystem 
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ecology and its aftermath helps us rhetoricians, and may help 
ecologists themselves, understand their disciplinary divisions as 
continuous reenactments of a massive social drama. 
A large body of ecological literature is dedicated to bridging the 
disciplinary gaps in ecology—gaps that some ecologists may 
perceive as natural, ancient, and formidable as the Grand Canyon.  
But seen as the reenactment of a merely decades-old social drama, 
the disciplinary divisions appear less like the result of 
incommensurable ways of knowing and seeing and more like 
different, though not necessarily incommensurable, ways of doing 
and being. According to a post-plural Turnerian analysis, 
disciplinary gaps may still seem formidable, but they are always 
traversable.  If ecologists understand their disciplinary differences 
as different ways of looking at a fixed reality, they are likely to 
search for reintegration by asking how we can better know that 
fixed reality.  If, however, ecologists understand their disciplinary 
differences as ways of enacting multiple realities, they may search 
for reintegration by asking how they can better act in the face of 
uncertainty. 
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